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CONTRACT LAW AS A
VIABLE ALTERNATIVE
TO PROBLEMS OF
INFORMED CONSENT
MARTIN L. NORTON, M.D.*
The problems of the physician in today's society have been com-
pounded by the increasing number of malpractice issues. The latest and
thorniest problem involves the concept of "informed consent," embodying
the expression of Justice Cardozo that every individual has the innate right
to determine what shall be done with himself.' Informed consent advances
the conceptualization to include an understanding of what is proposed for
one's medical or surgical management.! Intrinsic to this is the need to
utilize clear terminology and to discuss potential complications as well as
alternative modes of therapy and their specific attributes and disadvan-
tages. The problem presented is that any question as to whether the pa-
tient truly understood his physician's explanation immediately becomes a
jury issue, i.e., a matter of fact. Compounding the complexity of the prob-
lem are recent decisions indicating the need for the doctor to provide
whatever information the patient may require for his decisions rather than
conform to a standard of practice in this regard.3
We have no clear-cut guidelines as to what to tell a patient, how much
to tell the patient, or the basis on which the doctor must choose the infor-
mation to be imparted. For example, should a one-in-a-million risk be
disclosed?4 And, indeed, we have no clear-cut guidelines as to what are the
criteria of import.5 Furthermore, neither legal nor medical precedent has
*Professor, Anesthesiology, Boston University Medical School and Center, Boston, Massa-
chusetts; M.D., 1955, New York Medical College, New York, New York.
I Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914). See also
Norton, Consent, A Problem in Medicine, 69 MICH. MED. 111 (1970).
, 2 HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL Consents 2 (Attorney's Volume, G. Stroud ed. 1971) [hereinafter
cited as HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL].
3 See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Cobbs v. Grant, 8 Cal. 3d
229, 502 P.2d 1, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1972); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 110 R.I. 606, 295 A.2d 676
(1972); Miller v. Kennedy, 11 Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852 (1974). See also HOSPITAL LAW
MANUAL, supra note 2, at 2-9.
' In both Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969), and Sterling Drug, Inc.
v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966), a high level of duty was imposed on a drug company
disseminating drugs with possible side effects.
See Norton, When Does an Experimental/Innovative Procedure Become an Accepted
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been established as a matter of law, and neither the "reasonable man" nor
"standard of care" legal fictions-nor any other similar legal fic-
tion-serves as a pilot through the channels of this dilemma. As one com-
mentator has noted:
This confusion emanates, in part, from the indiscriminate use of such words
as . . . "informed consent." . . . [These words are] not terms of art that
have a definite meaning established by decisions or statutes . . . [but]
journalistic type words that mean what the user intends them to mean. Two
people can use such words in their communications and be referring to en-
tirely different ideas. A medical analogy would be the expression "heart
trouble.'
Confusion has thus been created by ill-considered court opinions and
dicta and efforts, in essence, at making law rather than interpreting law,7
completely ignoring other possible bases for liability such as contract.
In contract law, liability is possible simply because an agreement to
perform an act was made even though it later develops that the physician
simply cannot perform and even though the patient's condition was made
no worse.8 Thus, obtaining no help from a strict application of tort law, this
author looks to another source-that of contracts. Here we have extensive
precedent, and indeed growing indications, of a middle route between tort
and contract law, an example of which is found in the field of consumer
protection as it relates to implied warranty.' This ultimate interrela-
tionship has been manifest in the very confused historical origin between
the two legal remedies of tort and contract to which few courts have fully
addressed themselves.'" Before applying such an interrelationship to in-
formed consent, let us first review some basic principles of contract law."
Procedure?, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN EXPERIMENTATION
(1974).
1 M. Plant, Informed Consent - A New Area of Malpractice Liability, in INSTITUTE OF CON-
TINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 29-30 (2d ed. 1964).
See note 4 supra.
Hawkins v. McGee, 84 N.H. 114, 146 A. 641 (1929) (doctor held liable in contract when he
failed to fulfill his express guarantee to restore child to perfect health).
' Santo v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 64, 207 A.2d 305, 311 (1965) (implied
warranty action commences in contract and terminates in tort). See also Kessler, Products
Liability, 76 YALE L.J. 887. 891 (1967).
1 See W. PROSSER, The Borderline of Tort and Contract, in SELECTED TOPICS ON THE LAW OF
TORT 380 (1954); Poulton, Tort or Contract, 82 L.Q. REV. 346 (1966); Thornton, The Elastic
Concept of Tort and Contract as Applied by the Court of New York, 14 BROOKLYN L. REV.
196 (1948).
" The sections of this paper which deal with general contract principles were obtained from
A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS (1952); L. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS (1965); S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (3d
ed. 1957); W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as W. PROSSER].
Because of the extensive reliance on these works, citations to specific sections and page
numbers have been omitted.
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CONTRACT PRINCIPLES
The term "contract" has been defined in many ways, and it is a
common error to suppose that legal terms have one absolute and eternally
correct definition. A study of the many usages of the term "contract"
indicates three concepts, to wit: (1) the series of operative acts of the
parties, or some part of these acts, expressing their assent; (2) a physical
document executed by the parties; and, (3) the legal relations resulting
from the operative acts of the parties. All of these concepts include the
relation of right in one party and duty in the other. A contract has been
defined, therefore, as a promise or set of promises for the breach of which
the law gives a remedy or the performance of which the law recognizes as
a duty. This duty does not inhere in the agreement itself but in the law
applicable to the agreement-that is, by operation of law, one who makes
a promise is bound to perform it. A contract is not law nor does it make
law. It is the agreement plus the law that make the ordinary contract an
enforceable obligation. Thus, duties are imposed rather than assumed.
However, the conditions of legal liability can ordinarily be regulated by the
terms of the contract. In fact, the parties often agree in advance as to what
the damages or remedy might be in the event one party commits a breach.
A good example would be liquidated damages clauses in construction con-
tracts wherein the contractor agrees to pay a specific penalty for each day
the project is late in completion.
Contracts can be express, as when the terms are stated by the parties,
or they may be implied in fact, as when the terms of the contract are
inferred from the facts of the case. Where, for example, a person performs
services for another at the other's request and there is no express agree-
ment as to compensation, a promise to pay the reasonable value of the
services may be inferred. This promise to pay the reasonable value of the
services is implied where one performs for another, with the other's knowl-
edge, a specifically useful service for which a charge is usually made, and
the latter either expresses no dissent or avails himself of the service.
To form a binding contract, an agreement must be made by compe-
tent parties who express definite assent in the forms required by law. The
Statute of Frauds requires that contracts which cannot be performed
within one year be in written form, or at least evidenced by a writing,
whereas contracts which can be performed within a year may well be valid
and enforceable even though strictly oral. The agreement must also be
supported by sufficient consideration. It must not, at the time it is made,
be obviously impossible to perform; and it must not contravene principles
of law or public policy so as to be legally void at its inception as opposed
to voidable by subsequent agreement of the parties. A contract is formed
or made when the last act necessary to its formation has been accom-
plished, usually an acceptance by one party of an offer made by the other.
Thus, the location of the formation of the contract is usually the place at
which the offer is accepted.
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Consent Contracts
Generally parties may agree in a consent contract to waive statutory
rights, contract rights, or other rights unless a question of public policy is
involved. It is not the rule that any agreement which assumes to place a
person at the mercy of another's fault is void as against public policy. The
law looks with disfavor, however, on provisions which relieve a person from
liability for his own fault or wrong. It has been held that clauses limiting
liability (exculpatory by their nature) are to be given rigid scrutiny by the
courts and will not be enforced unless the limitation is fairly and honestly
negotiated by the parties and entered into with full understanding of its
implications; this is particularly true where the private contract is the only
means one of the parties has of filling an important need. 2
A release contract may be void as against public policy where one
party seeks to be absolved from liability for future negligence. Further, a
person cannot contract beforehand that he will not litigate a claim that
may thereafter arise. Since it is the policy of the law to furnish everyone
with legal remedies for any injuries received at the hands of another, an
agreement which essentially imposes a penalty for seeking such a legal
remedy is contrary to public policy and is subject to the penalty of
forfeiture. Such an agreement must, of course, be distinguished from one
which seeks to limit damages or recovery in advance. This type of contract
is clearly legal as long as the damages stipulated in advance represent the
parties' reasonable estimate of what the damages might be and do not
therefore represent an arbitrary penalty.
Interrelationship between Contract and Tort
The prevailing rule on contractual remedies seems to be that a con-
tract will not be construed to limit the remedial rights of the parties unless
such an intention is clear. Nevertheless, when the contract prescribes a
remedy for a breach, that remedy is generally exclusive if the contract
clearly shows an intention to make it so. Where, however, there is no
express or implied limitation in the contract making the stated remedy
exclusive, the prevailing view seems to be that a party may at his election
pursue either the prescribed remedy or any remedy the law gives as, for
example, a tort action.
It has been stated that a mere breach of contract cannot be converted
into a tort. The dividing line between contract breaches and commission
of torts, however, is often dim and uncertain. A tort may also include acts
which involve a breach of contract. Thus, the same act may sustain an
action based upon either tort or contract. Under this rule, it has been held
12 For a discussion of the effects of a contract pursuant to which one party enjoys dispropor-
tionately greater bargaining power than the other see note 39 infra.
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that accompanying every contract there is a common law duty to perform
the thing agreed to be done with care, skill, reasonable expedience, and
faithfulness; and the negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is
a tort as well as a breach of contract. As noted above, under such circum-
stances, the general rule is that the plaintiff may elect which remedy to
pursue. The dividing line seems to revolve around nonfeasance (doing
nothing) and misfeasance (doing it improperly). The relationship between
misfeasance and negligence issues seems obvious. In this context, we must
mention the "common callings" concept of torts. This has been applied to
public officers,' 3 utilities,'4 and others'5 for nonperformance or even failure
to agree to perform. Until recently, however, in the absence of specific
legislation, a physician could not be held liable for turning people away
for any reason or even for no reason at all.'6 The obvious objective of
contract law must be noted to be to regularize the relationships between
specific professions or industries and society, including the relationship
between physician and patient.
CONTRACT RELATIONSHIPS
The contract between patient and doctor'7 is normally implied rather
than express. The terms of this implied contract include: (1) that the
physician will care for the patient's illness; (2) that the physician will
exercise reasonable caution and skill appropriate to his special training;
and, (3) that the patient will pay the physician the reasonable value of the
service rendered. This implied contract between the doctor and the patient
does not exist until both parties, albeit impliedly, agree. Where the patient
is incompetent and thus cannot contract, however, another party such as
a parent or guardian must agree on his behalf before a contract is formed.'8
The contract of the parties is a tacit one based upon the conduct of
the parties rather than explicit oral or written agreement. Depending upon
the fact situation, this agreement can begin, for example, by (1) the pa-
tient merely entering a free clinic; (2) the nurse, as the doctor's agent,
informing the doctor of the patient's illness and his commenting thereon
'1 Hupe v. Sommer, 88 Kan. 561, 129 P. 136 (1913); Horner v. Terpin, 63 S.D. 309, 258 N.W.
140 (1934).
" Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Graham, 188 Okla. 521, 111 P.2d 173 (1941).
For example, the "common callings" concept has been applied to common carriers,
innkeepers, and public warehousemen. See W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 615.
,6 Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901). See also Randolph's Adm'r v.
Snyder, 139 Ky. 159, 129 S.W. 562 (1910). The physician is bound, however, by civil rights
legislation. See note 18 infra.
See generally C.E. WASMUTH, LAW AND THE SURGICAL TEAM 209-51 (1969).
In this connection, the question is apparently still open as to whether the doctor can refuse
to enter into the contract solely because of the patient's race, religion, or national origin;
however, the judicial trend in the area of civil rights indicates that the doctor can no longer
so refuse. See W. PROSSER, supra note 11, at 615.
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(which same comment then is communicated to the patient); (3) the doc-
tor merely asking the patient a question about his illness or physically
examining him; or, (4) the doctor discussing the patient's illness over the
telephone with him. From the foregoing, it is clear that the circumstances
surrounding the contract between the patient and the doctor do not have
to be particularly intimate before a court will conclude that a contract was
formed. Thus, the doctor must take precautions to insure that the contrac-
tual relationship is not entered into inadvertently.
As has been noted, one of the implied terms of the contract is that the
doctor will exercise reasonable skill and caution. Another implied term is
that the doctor will care for the patient. The physician runs the risk of
breaching the contract (as well as being negligent in tort) if he attempts
to limit abruptly the scope of, or terminate, the contract. To avoid this
breach of contract and a potential negligence claim, any limitations on the
normal terms of the implied contract must explicitly be made known to
patients and agreed to by them. Further, if these limitations cause a situa-
tion where the doctor does not intend to render all of the necessary medical
care, the doctor must provide an alternative source of care to which the
patient is referred. The source to whom the patient is being referred must,
of course, have agreed with the doctor to give the patient this care. Other-
wise, it is not an alternative source at all.
Examples of limitations a doctor might wish to put on the contract
with his patient include: (1) no house calls; (2) periods during which the
doctor will not be available because he is, for example, taking a vacation
or a day off or rotating hours with a partner; (3) service only during office
hours; (4) no continuing relationship since this is but an initial consulta-
tion and not a referral; (5) examination of the patient conducted for pur-
poses other than treatment, such as teaching, learning, or data collection
for an insurance company.
Termination of the doctor-patient contract must be done within the
legal framework for ending contracts if the doctor is to avoid a breach. The
patient can, of course, unilaterally withdraw from the contract. If this
occurs, to protect himself, the doctor is wise to inform the patient in
writing that he understands that the patient has ended the agreement,
advise the patient of any further medical care he should receive, and possi-
bly offer the patient referral to another doctor and cooperation with this
or any other doctor the patient selects. If the physician wishes to end the
contract unilaterally, he must at least give the patient sufficient warning
and inform the patient where he can obtain alternative sources of care.
Failure to take these steps may well lead to a claim that the doctor aban-
doned the patient. The third method of terminating the contract is by
mutual agreement between the doctor and the patient. This may occur
when they both agree that no future treatment is necessary, or, when the
patient is referred to another doctor or a specialist with the understanding
that this second doctor will assume treatment of the patient from that
point on.
21 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1975
Part of the original implied contract is the implied consent of the
patient to be treated by the doctor. When, however, the methods of medi-
cal care to be used in diagnosis or therapy become potentially dangerous
or, when, as in the case of sterilization, they have known serious or irre-
versible side effects, the patient's consent must be explicitly obtained in
advance of the treatment. This should be done in a writing, an express
contract, in order to have the necessary evidence that consent was obtained
if a question later arises. Failure to obtain consent may be grounds for an
action in battery. Further, if the patient is not properly forewarned of the
possible results of the proposed treatment, his consent becomes, in the eyes
of the law, no consent at all. This again opens the doctor to an action in
battery. In cases where the medical requirements of the patient prevent
advising him of such matters as risks and side effects, the requirement that
the patient be informed gives way. To protect himself, however, the doctor
is wise to discuss the issues with a responsible relative and obtain his or
her consent. With the exception of those instances involving consent of
parents or legal guardians, the contract aspects of this third party consent
in a medical situation have not, to date, received judicial attention. With
the advent of Good Samaritan statutes, however, the physician's stance is
being reviewed. Vermont has already enacted a statute,'9 similar to many
in Europe, requiring that .aid be rendered to all who are seriously ill or
injured; thus, the doctor's relationship with the patient becomes a contrac-
tual one based on the aims and objectives of society rather than on a
privity of interests voluntarily and mutually acted upon.
The interaction of contract and tort is even more evident in the area
of misfeasance and negligence. The American courts, by dicta, have ex-
tended tort liability to virtually every contractual situation where defec-
tive performance may injure the individual. Attorneys" and physicians2
have been held liable in tort for negligence.
If a defendant may be held liable for the neglect of a duty imposed on him,
independently of any contract, by operation of law, a fortiori ought he to be
liable where he has come under an obligation to use care as the result of an
undertaking founded on a consideration. Where the duty has its roots in
contract, the undertaking to observe due care may be implied from the rela-
tionship, and should it be the fact that a breach of the agreement also consti-
tutes such a failure to exercise care as amounts to a tort, the plaintiff may
elect, . . . to sue in case or in assumpsit.Y
What I am leading up to is the essence of this presentation-a recommen-
dation that our legislatures and judiciary begin seriously to analyze and
" VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519(a), (c) (1968).
20 See Coggin, Attorney Negligence ... A Suit Within a Suit, 60 W. VA. L. REv. 225 (1958).
, Huysman v. Kirsch, 6 Cal. 2d 302, 57 P.2d 908 (1936).
Flint and Walling Mfg. Co. v. Beckett, 167 Ind. 491, 498, 79 N.E. 503, 505 (1906).
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consider contract law as a more reasonable approach to those negligence
issues specifically involving the problems of informed consent. 3
There can be no question of privity since the patient and practitioner
both have direct contact and explicit and/or implied contractual relation-
ships. 4 The duty of a physician or surgeon to act with skill and due care
has its foundations in public considerations which are inseparable from the
nature and exercise of his calling. It is predicated by the law on the rela-
tionship which exists between physician and patient which is the result of
a consensual transaction. Furthermore, this relationship is contractual,
whether viewed as an express contract, one implied in fact, or one implied
in law (a legal fiction purporting to effect a just result regardless of the
intentions of the parties) .25
The similarity of "standard practice" contract concepts and "stan-
dard of care" negligence precepts is evident.26 In many situations it may
be difficult to distinguish between contractual obligations and those im-
posed by customary law. This is particularly true in the area of commercial
transactions where repetitive dealings tend to create standardized expecta-
tions. Thus, if problems arise which are left without verbal solution in the
parties' contract, they will commonly be resolved by a determination of
what "standard practice" is with respect to the issues in question. 27 As to
similarities between "informed consent" in contract and tort, a compari-
son of relevant portions of the Restatement of Contracts and the
Restatement of Torts proves to be significant. The Restatement of
Contracts states that "(1) There is no privilege of non-disclosure, by a
party who. . . knows that the other party is acting under a mistake as to
undisclosed material facts, and the mistake if mutual would render void-
able a transaction caused by relying thereon. . .(2) Where non-disclosure
is not privileged it has the effect of a material misrepresentation. '28 The
Restatement of Torts provides that "One party to a business transaction
is under a duty to disclose to the other before the transaction is consum-
mated . . .facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is
about to enter into the transaction under a mistake as to such facts and
that the other, because of the relationship between them, the customs in
the trade, or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a
disclosure of such facts. '2
n See F. KESSLER & G. GILMORE, CONTRACTS, CASES AND MATERIALS 116-17 (2d ed. 1970). For
a balance scale of the various factors involved in tort and contract theories of recovery see
Appendix I infra.
" For a discussion of privity of contract see Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 HARV. L. REV.
1225 (1937).
1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3A (3d ed. 1957).
26 L.L. FULLER & M.A. EISENBERG, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 93 (3d ed. 1972).
27 Id. On standard practice and usage of trade see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 248
(1973).
" RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 472 (1932).
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (2)(e) (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966).
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Whenever considering contract issues, the terms "offer," "accept-
ance," and "consideration" become paramount. In the medicolegal sense,
the offer is based on the reliance of the patient on the physician presenting
himself as a professional practitioner of the healing arts. The consideration
or exchange is the application of the healing art in exchange for a financial
reward-i.e., a fiduciary relationship.°
We often hear the comment in our law schools that "[f]aw is the
expression of societal needs." Society has indeed begun to express itself.
In Minneapolis, Minnesota, Dr. Donnell D. Etzweiler has expressed it this
way:
The written contract formalizes the concept that patients share in the re-
sponsibility for their own health. Consumer participation can be effective
only if patients are properly prepared to assume these responsibilities and are
accepted as members of the health care team ...
. . . When you write it out, it means more. It's a motivational thing
31
One enterprising firm has prepared informational briefs in the form of a
pseudocontract. 32 These have been sold to medical practitioners for use in
imparting information regarding intended medical and surgical manage-
ment. The signature imposed is intended to serve as an acknowledgement
of information so received; a blank for a witness' signature is provided;
and, the form is intended to be dated. The format is contract. The princi-
ple is contract.
These two examples suggest the major problems of informed consent
which must be addressed in regard to contract factors as well, to wit:
1. Would the data presented prove to be detrimental to the,
patient? Would a patient, fearful of possible though remote di-
astrous complications, delay surgery and other therapy to the
point where that very delay presents additional risk to health
and even life? What are the psychological effects? How will this
affect the doctor-patient relationship of trust?
2. Would all patients from all backgrounds understand the
content and implications of the oral explanation or explicit,
written contract provisions? The problems of language, col-
loquial usage, ethnic variances, and many other factors are pres-
ent here.
3. Would any consent, informed or not, be truly free of coer-
cion? In this example, what does the patient with a medical
need for an exploratory (diagnostic) abdominal laparotomy
See Miller, The Contractual Liability of Physicians and Surgeons, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 413
(1953).
s' American Medical News, Oct. 14, 1974, at 12, col. 1.
3 In-Forms, Inc., P.O. Box 4581, Albuquerque, N.M. Sample forms are reprinted in Appen-
dix II infra.
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(where the differential diagnosis might possibly include malig-
nancy) have as an alternative choice? Can the patient, for exam-
ple, tolerate surgery without anesthesia? Would this then be a
"contract of adhesion"?
4. How much does the patient really want to know? Despite
recent judicial opinions, 33 the pragmatic experience of every
physician indicates that in life, limb, or organ risk situations,
very many patients do not want to be extensively informed.
They eagerly seek the father figure-not God figure-to assume
the emotional and decisionmaking burden of the physician-
patient trust relationship. Is this a canard?
Another concern is the effect of the contract concept on the courts.
Certainly, we have adequate precedents both in medicine" and law for the
development of boards of arbitration. This arbitration provision could
readily be included in contracts. Inclusion would not be intended to avoid
the legal processes. Rather, it could provide an organized and more easily
accessible route for such processes. With this clause included, the number
of court cases could be limited by the use of administrative arbiters. Thus,
contract law, presenting an alternative, also provides a route to shorter
delays in litigation through the use of such administrative hearing examin-
ers. Precedent is found in the extant system of no-fault insurance hearings,
workmen's compensation boards, uninsured motorist funds, and assurance
land funds.
When considering the specific content of the proposed contracts, it is
important to keep in mind the admonition not to have predominant
clauses possibly considered as "exculpatory clauses" or leading to "con-
tracts of adhesion." Exculpatory clauses purporting to relieve from liabil-
ity for negligence are generally enforced "unless (1) it would be against the
settled public policy of the State to do so, or (2) there is something in the
social relationship of the parties militating against upholding the agree-
ment."3 Thus, it is apparent that, in the area of medical malpractice,
excessively restrictive clauses would be deemed to be void as against public
policy and wholly unenforceable. 6 Similar treatment would be given to
exculpatory clauses limiting liability. The Uniform Commercial Code
states that "[l]imitation of consequential damages for injury to the person
• . . is prima facie unconscionable,"37 though other provisions may be
applied.38 The principle is one of the prevention of apprehension and unfair
3 See note 4 supra.
1, N.J. SuP. CT. R. 4:25B, discussed in Karcher, Malpractice Claims Against Doctors: New
Jersey's Screening Process, 53 A.B.A.J. 328 (1967).
Jackson v. First Nat'l Bank, 415 111. 453, 460, 114 N.E.2d 721, 725 (1953).
See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 80, § 91 (1971). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 575(b); Tunkl
v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 60 Cal. 2d 92, 383 P.2d 441, 32 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1963).
" UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-719(3).
U' UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE § 2-302 states:
21 CATHOLIC LAWYER, SPRING 1975
surprise and of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bar-
gaining power."
Another consideration in recommending the contract approach has to
do with the time to consider one's decisions. In nonemergency cases, there
is time: time to consider and reconsider; time for acceptance; time to place
the fear factor in proper perspective. Thus, this is a positive side of our
suggestion. It also suggests a dual doctrine providing for instructions and
explanation by the physician and consent (contract) by the patient. In-
deed, this would provide for efficient and earlier use of consultants, patient
advocates, and others involved in the decisionmaking process.
We must once again emphasize the fact that the creation of the
physician-patient relationship is a matter of ordinary contract law in most
circumstances. An "express" contract will be held to exist when a patient
seeks out a physician and asks him to treat a specific ailment and the
physician agrees to do so. An "implied" contract then extends from the
actions of the parties and not from the verbal contract. We are merely
taking the question of whether an implied contract did in fact exist out of
the realm of conjecture.
CONCLUSION
We must come to the recognition that the tort remedy does not basi-
cally insure the best medical care. Tort law "protects" the individual client
or patient only if we consider recompense or retribution as protection.
There is no definitive evidence that the quality of medical care has im-
proved under the current tort remedies of law. We also need to be fully
aware of the societal effects of our current system. Much has been written
about the practice of "defensive medicine." There can be no question
about overtreatment, excessive use of diagnostic and documentational
1. If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause in the contract to
have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the
contract or it may enforce the remainder of the contract, without the unconscionable
clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any
unconscionable result.
2. When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any clause
thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reasonable opportunity
to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in
making the determination.
' In Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948), the court refused to enforce a
contract in which the plaintiff had, by virtue of its superior bargaining power, retained the
right to withdraw from the contract at no cost to itself under certain circumstances. See also
Bolgar, Contract of Adhesion: A Comparison of Theory and Practice, 20 AM. J. COMP. L. 53
(1972); Dauer, Contracts of Adhesion in Light of Bargain Hypothesis: An Introduction, 5
AKRON L. REV. 1 (1972); Reeves, Exculpatory Clause: Does It Really "Save Harmless"?, 37
J.B. Ass'N KAN. 11 (1968); Note, A New Test of Exculpatory Clauses in Texas: A Much
Needed Change, 26 BAYLOR L. REV. 449 (1974); Note, Contracts of Adhesion Under California
Law, 1 U. SAN FRAN. L. REV. 306 (1967).
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tests, ever increasing costs of practice, and, therefore, the cost to the pa-
tient and public. The effect of this latter problem, never realistically faced
by ardent supporters of our advocacy system, certainly contributes to the
patient entering the health delivery system ever later.
In discussions with members of both the medical and legal professions,
this author has found an unbelievable rigidity. Mental slavery to precedent
alone ignores the very flexibility inherent in the legal process. Certainly we
are aware of decision reversal, dictum, and, above all, the herald signal
that minority opinions have often given to enlightened legal and social
expression. Progress in law and justice can never be achieved without that
intellectual experimentation which challenges precedent, customary prac-
tice, and the concepts of status quo. The concepts and problems presented
herein may very well fall within this category of intellectual experimenta-
tion. That decision lies within the prerogatives of the innovative attorney
and judiciary concerned with the effects of the legal process on society as
a whole rather than on an individual client.
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APPENDIX I
SCHEMATIC COMPARISON OF CONTRACT AND TORTS
(INFORMED CONSENT STRESSED)
CONCEPT
1. Rationale
2. Precedent
3. Legal Burden
4. Agreement
5. Vehicle
6. Extent
7. Duties
CONTRACT
Embodies protection of the
individual in the context of
societal interests.
Extensive legal precedent
for guidance.
Equally shared by plaintiff
and defendant.
Clearly mutual.
Written explicit.
Specifically delineated.
Primarily fixed by the parties
themselves.
8. Scope of Damage
Test of Fors'eeability
9. Basis Voluntary agreement of
mutuality (most of the time).
10. Consumer Protection A blend of contract and tort.
11. Privity
12. Liability
Explicit.
Strict liability for failure to
perform.
TORT:
INFORMED CONSENT
Informed consent can be con-
sidered a form of warranty-
a promise.
Confused definition of informed
consent, no specific precedent,
vague.
Primarily borne by physician
in reality despite legal fiction
of plaintiff having to prove
"fault."
Patient only-physician must
prove patient agreed. Consent
problem in proof.
Primarily verbal; occasionally
explicit and written (value
questioned at present);
implied most often.
Impossible to cover potentialities
completely or adequately.
Many unknown factors.
Primarily fixed by law or its
interpretation.
Proximate cause rule. There-
after, can expand without
limit to include psychological
and other questionably
provable harm.
Negligence issue-difficult to
prove either voluntary or
agreement aspect.
Implied warranty in both.
Implicit.
Need proof of negligence or
other wrongful conduct. For
example, failure to perform
leading to injury (proximate
cause) would have to be proved.
Also need sequence of 4
elements of tort (duty, failure
of duty, proximate cause,
injury).
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13. Statute of
Limitations
14, Advantages
15. Disadvantages
Usually longer.
1. Limited to those for which
defendant has tacitly or
impliedly assumed and/or
foreseen.
2. Based on law and equity,
not emotion and dramatics.
May and usually will require
third party to interpret and
prepare. Money to pay for
such services may not be
available to all.
Shorter. A fiction under the
"discovery rule," however,
may in fact lead to a period of
time which would be longer
than one found in contract.
1 Primarily benefits the
plaintiff.
2. Punitive damages allowed.
3. Recovery allowed for
"mental suffering" emotion
rules-not fact or law.
4. Recovery for wrongful death
on basis of failure to inform.
Also other tort bases.
5. May obtain even where
contract fails for lack of
proof, uncertainty, etc.
Rarely includes third party.
No specific fees. Available to
all. Almost impossible for
patient to resist denying he
did hear and understand
physician's explanation, and,
just as unrealistic to expect
M.D. to prove he did give an
acceptable explanation. Major
problem of proof.
BENEFITS TO SOCIETY OF CONTRACT VERSUS TORT AND
BENEFITS TO PATIENT-DOCTOR RELATIONSHIP
Philosophic approach: A clearer delineation of the responsibility of each party.
Societal interests should and indeed must-if we are not to have an unbearable
burden on the professions-require the patient to accept knowingly some of the
risks of health care. The practicalities of the present trend have been to place the
burden on the professional. Anesthesia problems and cardiac arrest are illustrative.
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APPENDIX II-1
PROCEDURE: GENERAL ANESTHESIA
Your doctor plans to give you "general anesthesia" for the operation you are considering.
General anesthesia involves making the patient completely unconscious or "completely out"
during the operation. The anesthetic drugs are usually given to the patient by injecting them
into the patient's bloodstream and by having the patient inhale them. Complications from
general anesthesia are infrequent, but they do occur; and complications are more frequent
in patients who are in poor general health than in patients who are in good general health.
The person who administers the anesthetic may have to place a tube from the mouth or nose
of the patient and into his windpipe in order to assist breathing. This is usually done when
the patient is unconscious, and has been known to cause temporary and permanent damage
to the lips, teeth, nose, throat, voice box, and windpipe. Because the patient loses protective
reflexes while under general anesthesia, damage to the eyes and networks or nerves in the
body is possible. This damage could cause pain in the eyes; decreased vision; and numbness,
weakness, pain, and paralysis in the arms, legs, trunk and neck. Rarely, the drugs which are
used in general anesthesia can have toxic or damaging effects on the liver, kidneys, heart
and lungs. Because general anesthesia temporarily impairs the patient's breathing mecha-
nisms, pneumonia, lung collapse, water on the lungs, and even brain damage are also potential
complications. It is also possible that airway obstruction or a state of "suffocation" will occur
during general anesthesia. This could result in the need for an emergency tracheostomy,
which is an operation in which the neck and windpipe are opened so that breathing can be
maintained. Another rare complication of general anesthesia is injury to the blood vessels
that supply blood to the hands or feet. This injury could cause permanent deformity of the
hands or feet, or even "kill" fingers and toes. General anesthesia temporarily impairs the
'function of the urinary system. Occasionally patients have difficulty urinating after this type
of anesthesia. This could result in the need for a temporary tube being placed in the urinary
bladder to allow urine to drain.
Some of the complications of general anesthesia may require surgery; some may cause
permanent deformity and inconvenience and prolonged illness; and rarely, some are fatal.
There are also other potential complications from general anesthesia. However, it is not
possible to advise you of every imaginable complication. The purpose of this form is not to
frighten you or upset you. The bad complications referred to are extremely unlikely. The
purpose of this form is merely to insure that your decision to have general anesthesia is not
made in ignorance of the risks of this procedure.
Additional risks:
(To be filled in by
doctor, as necessary)
I CERTIFY: I have read or had read to me the contents of this form; I understand the risks
involved in this procedure; all blanks or statements requiring insertion or completion were
filled in, or crossed out before I signed.
Date: Signed:
(By patient or person legally
authorized to consent for
patient)
Witness:
(THIS IS NOT A CONSENT FORM. A CONSENT FORM MUST ALSO BE SIGNED
BY THE PATIENT.)
IN-forms, Inc. No. 93 © 1973
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PROCEDURE: SPINAL ANESTHESIA
Your doctor plans to give you "spinal anesthesia" for the operation you are considering.
Spinal anesthesia involves injecting a drug directly into the spinal canal to cause a loss of
feeling and temporary paralysis in approximately the lower one-half of the body. This drug
is injected through a needle which is inserted into the back and into the spinal canal. A
"local" anesthetic or medicine to "deaden" the skin is usually administered first so that the
entire procedure will involve only very little pain. Complications from spinal anesthesia are
infrequent, but they do occur; and complications are more frequent in patients who are in
poor general health than in patients who are in good general health.
Headache may occur following spinal anesthesia. Generally, this lasts only a few days at
most; however, it has been known to last weeks or months. Occasionally, this headache is
complicated by buzzing in the ears and difficulty in hearing. Since spinal anesthesia involves
temporary paralysis of nerves, various nervous system complications very rarely occur. These
complications could cause weakness or paralysis of eye muscles; inability to urinate; inability
to control bowel movements; loss of sexual function; meningitis, or inflammation and disease
of the lining of the brain and spinal cord; disease of the spinal cord, itself; partial or total
paralysis or inability to move a part of the body; and even death. Damage to the supporting
structures of the back also rarely occurs. This could cause temporary or permanent backache;
and numbness, weakness, and pain in the thighs, legs, and feet. Another rare complication
of spinal anesthesia is the development of infection. This can result in draining wounds,
painful and unsightly scars, prolonged illness, and the need for surgery.
Because spinal anesthesia temporarily alters the distribution of blood in the body, abnor-
malities of the heart, blood vessels, and kidneys are possible. Rarely, this can cause chronic
kidney disease, heart irregularities and heart stoppage, brain damage, and even death.
Some of the complications of spinal anesthesia may require later surgery; some may cause
permanent deformity, disability, inconvenience, and prolonged illness; and rarely, some are
fatal. There are also other potential complications from spinal anesthesia. However, it is not
possible to advise you of every imaginable complication. The purpose of this form is not to
frighten you or upset you. The bad complications referred to are extremely unlikely. The
purpose of this form is merely to insure that your decision to have spinal anesthesia is not
made in ignorance of the risks of this procedure.
Additional risks:
(To be filled in by
doctor, as necessary)
I CERTIFY: I have read or had read to me the contents of this form; I understand the risks
involved in this procedure; all blanks or statements requiring insertion or completion were
filled in, or crossed out before I signed.
Date: Signed:
(By patient or person legally
authorized to consent for patient)
Witness:
(THIS IS NOT A CONSENT FORM. A CONSENT FORM MUST ALSO BE SIGNED
BY THE PATIENT.)
IN-forms, Inc. No. 95 0 1973
